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Software agents are increasingly being used to represent humans in on-line auctions. Such agents
have the advantages of being able to systematically monitor a wide variety of auctions and then
make rapid decisions about what bids to place in what auctions. They can do this continuously and
repetitively without losing concentration. Moreover, in complex multiple auction settings, agents
may need to modify their behavior in one auction depending on what is happening in another. To
provide a means of evaluating and comparing (benchmarking) research methods in this area, the
Trading Agent Competition (TAC) was established. This competition involves a number of agents
bidding against one another in a number of related auctions (operating different protocols) to
purchase travel packages for customers. Against this background, this artcle describes the design,
implementation and evaluation of our adaptive autonomous trading agent, SouthamptonTAC, one
of the most successful participants in TAC 2002.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence—intelligent agents; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce
General Terms: Algorithms, Design, Experimentation
Additional Key Words and Phrases: On-line auctions, bidding strategy, trading agent competition
1. INTRODUCTION
On-line auctions are a key component of many e-commerce systems [He et al.
2003] and software agents are increasingly being used in such settings in or-
der to make effective and efﬁcient purchases. Given the potential and the im-
portance of using agents in on-line auction settings, there has been consid-
ered a research endeavor in developing bidding strategies for multiple auctions
[Anthony and Jennings 2003] (see Section 4 for more details). Given this fact, it
was decided to establish an International Trading Agent Competition (TAC) as
a means of comparing and evaluating work in this area [Wellman et al. 2001].
The TAC has been set up so that there is no optimal bidding strategy that is
guaranteed to always win. This is because an agent’s decision making involves
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Table I. SouthamptonTAC’s Customer Preferences for Game 4594. PAD
and PDD Stand for Preferred Arrival and Preferred Departure Date.
HV Stands for the Reservation Value of Staying in the Tampa Tower
Hotel, and WV, PV and MV Stand for the Utility Associated with
Attending Alligator Wrestling, the Amusement Park and the Museum
Customer PAD PDD HV WV PV MV
1 Day 3 Day 5 142 40 109 113
2 Day 1 Day 2 80 21 108 8
3 Day 4 Day 5 79 149 32 195
4 Day 1 Day 4 131 81 83 179
5 Day 2 Day 4 134 50 155 115
6 Day 2 Day 4 135 75 127 48
7 Day 3 Day 4 98 199 20 39
8 Day 1 Day 4 120 69 123 104
high degrees of uncertainty caused by the random features of the game, the op-
ponents’ strategies and the particular combination of opponents. Against this
background, this article reports upon the design, implementation and evalu-
ation of our particular trading agent (called SouthamptonTAC) in the 2002
competition.1
In a TAC trading game, there are eight software agents (entrants to the
competition) that compete against each other in a variety of auctions to assem-
ble travel packages for their individual customers according to their prefer-
ences for the trip.2 A valid travel package for an individual customer consists of
(i) a round trip ﬂight during a 5-day period (between TACtown and Tampa) and
(ii)astayatthesamehotel3 foreverynightbetweentheirarrivalanddeparture
dates. Moreover, arranging appropriate entertainment events during the trip
increases the utility for the customers. The objective of each agent is to max-
imise the total satisfaction of its eight customers (i.e., the sum of the customers’
utilities). Customers have individual preferences over which days they want to
be in Tampa, the type of hotel they stay in, and which entertainment they want
to attend. This data is randomly generated by the TAC server in each game
(see Table I for an example).
Each agent communicates with the TAC server through a TCP-based agent
programming interface in order to get current market information and to place
its bids. An individual game lasts 12 minutes and involves 28 auctions. Each
of the three good types are traded in an auction with different rules:
—Flights. TACAIR is the only airline selling ﬂights (placing asks). Tickets
for these ﬂights are unlimited and are sold in single seller auctions. There
are eight such auctions (TACtown to Tampa (day 1 to 4) and back (day 2
to 5)). Flight ask prices update randomly, every 24 to 32 seconds, by a value
drawn from a range determined by the elapsed auction time and a randomly
drawn value. Flight auctions clear continuously during the game. Thus, any
1More details of this competition and its 26 entrants can be found at http://www.sics.se/tac.
2These packages are assembled by the agent bidding in a number of auctions in which the other
bidders are other competition entrants.
3Customers are not allowed to change their hotels during the stay.
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buy bid an agent makes that is not less than the current ask price will match
immediately at the ask price. Those bids not matching immediately remain
in the auction as standing bids. In most cases, the earlier the ﬂight is bought,
the cheaper it is.
—Hotels. There are two hotels: Tampa Towers (T) and Shoreline Shanties (S).
T is nicer than S. Hotel rooms are traded in 16th price multi-unit English
auctions.Overall,thereareeighthotelauctions(foreachcombinationofhotel
and night apart from the last one), that close randomly one by one at the end
of every minute after the 4th. A hotel auction clears and matches bids when
it closes (i.e., 16 rooms are sold at the 16th highest price). While a given
auction is open, its ask price is the current 16th highest price and this price
is updated immediately in response to new bids. The price of other bids, such
as the highest bid, is not known by the agents. No withdrawal of hotel bids
is allowed. Suppose the current ask price is a, when an agent submits a new
bid, two conditions must be satisﬁed for it to be accepted: (i) it must offer to
buy at least one unit at a price of a C 1 or greater; (ii) if the agent’s current
bid would have resulted in the purchase of q units in the current state, the
new bid must offer to buy at least q units at a C 1 or greater.
—Entertainment. Each agent is randomly endowed with 12 entertainment
tickets at the beginning of the game. All agents can trade their tickets in
a continuous double auction (CDA). Overall, there are 12 CDAs (for each
kind of entertainment for each of days 1 to 4). Bids match at the price
of the standing bid in the CDA. An entertainment package is feasible if none
of the tickets are for events on the same day and all the tickets coincide with
the nights the customer is in town. No additional utility is obtained for a
customer attending the same type of entertainment more than once during
the trip.
A customer’s utility from a valid travel and entertainment package4 is given
by:
Utility D 1000 ¡ TravelPenalty C HotelBonus C FunBonus,
where TravelPenalty D 100 ¤ (jAD ¡ PADjCj DD ¡ PDDj)( AD and DD are the
customer’s actual arrival and departure dates), HotelBonus is the bonus if the
customer stays in T, and FunBonus is the sum of the reservation values of all
the entertainment a customer receives. To illustrate this, the allocations and
scores for SouthamptonTAC, given the preferences in Table I, are shown in
Table II. For example, the utility of customer 6 is obtained by the following:
TravelPenalty D 100 ¤ (jAD ¡ PADjCj DD ¡ PDDj) D 0,
HotelBonus D 135, FunBonus D 75 C 127 C 0 D 202,
Utility D 1000 ¡ 0 C 135 C 202 D 1337:
At the end of each game, the TAC scorer (on the TAC server) allocates the
agent’s travel goods to its individual customers optimally. The value for a par-
ticular allocation is the sum of the individual customer utilities (e.g. 9602). The
4An invalid travel package receives zero utility.
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Table II. SouthamptonTAC’s Customer Allocation from Game 4594.
W, P, M Stand for Alligator Wrestling, Amusement Park and
Museum and the Following Number Indicates the Date of the
Entertainment
Customer AD DD Hotel Entertainment Utility
1 Day 3 Day 5 T P3,M4 1364
2 Day 1 Day 2 T P1 1188
3 Day 4 Day 5 T M4 1274
4 Day 1 Day 2 T M1 1110
5 Day 3 Day 4 T P3 1189
6 Day 2 Day 4 T W2, P3 1337
7 Day 2 Day 3 T W2 1097
8 Day 1 Day 2 T P1 1043
Total utility: 9602
agent’s ﬁnal score is then the value of this allocation minus the cost of procuring
the goods.
Designing a bidding strategy for the TAC auction context is a challeng-
ing problem. First, there are interdependencies. These exist between different
kindsofauctions(e.g.,ﬂightswillbeuselessifthehotelroomsarenotavailable);
between different dates within the same kind of auction (e.g., customers must
stay in the same hotel during their stay); and between same day, same kind
counterpart auctions5 (e.g., if the price of T1 is high, the customer can change
to S1). Second, the bidding involves uncertainty. For example, ﬂight prices start
randomly and change continuously in a random fashion; one randomly selected
hotel auction closes from the 4th to 11th minute. Third, trade-offs exist in bid-
ding. For example, in ﬂight auctions, if an agent buys all the ﬂight tickets very
early, it may fail to buy the necessary hotel rooms that the ﬂights require.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the design of our agent. Section 3 describes the result of TAC-02 and evaluates
the performance of our agent in different environments. Section 4 discusses the
work of other teams participating in the TAC and Section 5 concludes.
2. SOUTHAMPTONTAC
SouthamptonTAC is an adaptive agent that varies its bidding strategy accord-
ing to its perception of the prevailing market conditions.
2.1 Classifying TAC Environments
Our post hoc analysis of the TAC-01 competition [He and Jennings 2002] shows
that an agent’s performance depends heavily on the risk attitude of its oppo-
nents. Here a risk-averse agent is one that buys a small number of ﬂight tickets
at the beginning of the game and that bids for hotels according to the situation
as the game progresses. This kind of agent is highly ﬂexible and copes well
when there is a signiﬁcant degree of competition and the hotel prices are high
5For the auction of the same day, T and S are called their counterpart auctions. For example, the
counterpart auction of T1 is S1 and the counterpart of S1 is T1. Also, we will use the abbreviation
Tn and Sn (1 · n · 4) for staying in the indicated hotel on a particular day.
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(see below). In contrast, a risk-seeking agent buys a large number of ﬂight
tickets at the beginning of the game and seldomly changes the travel plan of
its customers during the game. This kind of agent does well in environments
in which hotels are cheap. For example, when a hotel price goes up sharply,
a risk-averse agent would stop bidding on that hotel (changing the stay to a
counterpart hotel or reducing the trip period). In contrast, a risk-seeking agent
will insist on bidding for that hotel, although the price is very high. In so doing,
it hopes that the price will eventually stabilize (hence the risk). The conse-
quence of this variety is that, for broadly the same situation, different agents
can bring about widely varying ﬁnal prices. Based on the analysis reported in
He and Jennings [2002], we identify the following types of TAC environment:
—Competitive environments where the prices of the hotels are (very) high. This
is caused by (a) the high bid prices that agents place; (b) the fact that some
agents insist on bidding for hotels even when their ask price becomes high;
and (c) the fact that some agents increase their bids sharply rather than
gradually.Forexample,ingame4594,thepricesof T(S)are(intheincreasing
order of day): 5 (6), 238 (557), 155 (102), and 40 (11). For most customers
in this game, it is beneﬁcial for an agent to reduce the stay to a single day
(eitherday1orday4).Toachievethis,however,theagentneedstobeﬂexible.
Speciﬁcally, it cannot buy all the ﬂights at the very beginning of the game;
otherwise, when the hotel prices rise to high values, it has to give up the
travel package for some customers or pay these high prices for hotels. Being
predictive is also important. By predicting the price of the hotels, the agent
can make alternative plans to cope with the very high prices.
—Noncompetitive environments where there is very little competition for hotels
and an agent can obtain the rooms it wants at low prices. For example, in
game 6341, there is very little competition and the closing prices for T (S)
are 7 (12), 92 (27), 70 (53) and 62 (7). In this situation, the best strategy is to
buy all ﬂights earlier; since the agents can always get the hotels they want.
—Semicompetitive environments where prices are medium. There is competi-
tion, but it is not very severe. For example, in game 444, the clearing prices
for T (S) are 5 (2), 128 (71), 128 (60) and 116 (3).
2.2 The Agent Architecture
Figure 1 overviews the SouthamptonTAC agent. It connects to the TAC server
in a continuous series of rounds (lasting between 2 and 4 seconds). In each
round, our agent processes this ask/bid information in “Bids preprocessor” to
get the ﬂight prices, goods it actually owns and may possibly own (hotel rooms)
and its currently active bids. “Hotel price predictor” is used to predict the likely
clearing price of each hotel auction (see Section 2.3). All of this information is
then input to “Allocator,” which calculates the optimal distribution of goods to
customers given the current situation (using linear and integer programming
techniques). Given this assignment, the agent then determines its subsequent
bidding actions. “Hotel bid adjustor” takes the allocator’s output, the agent’s
current active bids, the hotel auction’s ask prices, as well as the predicted prices
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Fig. 1. Overview of the SouthamptonTAC-02 agent.
and decides whether to bid. “Flight categorizer” classiﬁes each ﬂight auction in
accordance with its expected change of price and, based on this, decides when
to bid and how many trips to bid for. “Entertainment bid processor” determines
the type and the amount of entertainment to bid for. All of this is broadly the
same as the SouthamptonTAC-01 agent, and more details can be found in He
and Jennings [2002].
Where SouthamptonTAC-02 differs from its predecessor is in the way that
it performs hotel price prediction (Section 2.3) and in having an environment
sensor in the architecture. This component (described in more detail in Section
2.4)aimstodeterminewhattypeofenvironmenttheagentispresentlysituated
in (as detailed in Section 2.1). The reason for doing this is so that the agent can
adapt its bidding strategy accordingly (see Section 2.5).
2.3 Hotel Price Prediction
Likeitspredecessor,SouthamptonTACusesfuzzyreasoningtechniques(specif-
ically the Sugeno controller [Sugeno 1985]) to predict hotel clearing prices
(see Section 3.3 for an evaluation of the effectiveness of our approach).
SouthamptonTAC-01 used two rule bases to make its predictions: (i) for when
both the good and bad hotels are open and (ii) for when the counterpart auction
was closed. However, we found that our predictions in the latter case could be
improved if we separated out the cases in which the counterpart auction had
just closed (within the last minute) and when it had been closed for a longer
period of time. This difference occurs because hotel prices change more rapidly
and with a different pattern when the counterpart has just closed. When the
counterpartauctionhasbeenclosedforalongerperiod,thechangesaresmaller.
We also simpliﬁed the prediction rules for the case where both auctions are still
open.Forexample,insomecases,thecurrentpriceinthecounterpartauctionis
not considered because we found the price change to be a better indicator than
the current price. In more detail, the three rule bases for SouthamptonTAC-02
are given in Tables III to V. The factors considered in the predictions are the
price of the hotel (P), the price of the counterpart hotel (CP), the price change
in the previous minute (C) and the previous price change of the counterpart
hotel (when it closed) (CC). In these tables, the hotel ask prices (P and CP) are
expressed in the fuzzy linguistic terms: high, medium, and low and the price
changes (C and CC) in the fuzzy linguistic terms quick, medium, and slow.
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Table III. Fuzzy Rule Base When Counterpart Auction is Open
IF P is high and C is quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is high and CP is high and C is not-quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is high and CP is not-high and C is not-quick THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is low and CP is high THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is low and CP is not-high THEN 1 is small.
IF P is medium and CP is high THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is medium and CP is not-high and C is not-slow THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is medium and CP is not-high and C is slow THEN 1 is small.
Table IV. Fuzzy Rule Base When Counterpart Auction Just Closed
IF P is high and C is not-slow and CC is quick THEN 1 is very-big.
IF P is high and C is not-slow and CC is not-quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is high and C is slow and CC is quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is high and C is slow and CC is not-quick THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is medium and C is quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is medium and C is medium and CC is quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is medium and C is medium and CC is not-quick THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is medium and C is slow and CC is quick THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is medium and C is slow and CC is not-quick THEN 1 is small.
IF P is low and C is slow and CC is quick THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is low and C is not-slow THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is low and C is slow and CC is not-quick THEN 1 is small.
Table V. Fuzzy Rule Base When Counterpart Auction has
Closed for More than One Minute
IF P is high and C is not-slow THEN 1 is big.
IF P is high and C is slow THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is medium and C is quick THEN 1 is big.
IF P is medium and C is medium THEN 1 is medium.
IF P is not-high and C is slow THEN 1 is small.
IF P is low and C is not-slow THEN 1 is medium.
1 2fsmall, medium, big, very-bigg is the increase that is added to the current
price to obtain the predicted clearing price.
2.4 TAC Environment Recognition
We treat the environment recognition problem as one of fuzzy pattern recog-
nition since it is impossible to precisely determine the type while the game
is running. To this end, we therefore apply the maximum similarity principle
[Pedrycz 1990] in the environment sensor component of the agent architecture.
This recognition process is used in two cases: before a game starts and during
a game. Before a game starts, the agent calculates the average hotel closing
prices of the previous 10 games6 from the price history and uses the maximum
average price as a reference price to classify the environment in a given game.
We use the maximum price in this fashion since if one price is high it is likely
6We chose ten (based on experience of playing the game) as a suitable indicator that is sufﬁciently
stable to not be inﬂuenced by atypical game outcomes, but sufﬁciently adaptive to respond to
genuine changes in the patterns of games.
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Fig. 2. Fuzzy sets of the three environment types.
that others will also be high and so the environment is competitive (mutatis
mutandis when the reference price is low or medium). During a game, the agent
continuously monitors the current hotel prices and records the current maxi-
mum price to see if the environment type changes from its initial prediction.
More formally, let Ti (Si) represent T (S) on day i, and PTi (PSi) represent the
current price if the agent is monitoring a running auction or the average his-
tory price if it is making its initial assessment of the environment of Ti (Si).
Supposethepricesof T1, :::,T 4,S 1,:::,S 4,are PT1, :::,P T 4,P S 1,:::,P S 4.Then,
Pmax (the maximum hotel price) is simply:
Pmax D max(PT1, PT2, PT3, PT4, PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4):
Let Ec, Es, and En correspond to the fuzzy sets that represent compet-
itive, semi-competitive and non-competitive environments respectively (see
Figure 2). Now the type of environment (") can be determined by ascertain-
ing which of the fuzzy sets the reference price has the strongest membership
to. Thus, if:
Ex(Pmax) D argmaxfEc(Pmax), Es(Pmax), En(Pmax)g,
then " is of environment type Ex, where x 2f c ,s ,n gand Ec(x), Es(x), and En(x)
are the similarity functions for the fuzzy sets Ec, Es, and En. These similarity
functions (denoted ¹) capture how much the hotel price belongs to each of the
different environments and they are deﬁned as follows:
¹EN(x) D
8
> <
> :
1 x < 50,
0 x > 120,
120¡x
70 50 · x · 120:
¹ES(x) D
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 100 < x < 150,
0 x > 200 or x < 50,
x¡50
50 50 · x · 100,
200¡x
50 150 · x · 200:
¹EC(x) D
8
> <
> :
1 x > 200,
0 x < 150,
x¡150
50 150 · x · 200:
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2.5 Varying the Bidding Strategy
After our experiences in TAC-01, we came to believe that there is no single best
strategy that can deal with all the different types of TAC environment. For
example, a risk-seeking agent that always allocates the optimal travel package
for its customers and buys ﬂights earlier is highly effective in noncompetitive
environments. This is because there is little competition in hotel bidding and
the agent can always obtain what it wants. On the other hand, delaying buying
ﬂights and shortening the stay of customers works well in competitive games.
For this reason, SouthamptonTAC dynamically varies its bidding strategy ac-
cording to its assessment of the environment type (see Section 3.4 for an eval-
uation of the effectiveness of being able to do this). In games it deems noncom-
petitive, SouthamptonTAC buys all of its ﬂight tickets at the beginning of the
game and never changes the travel plan of its clients (unless it senses a change
in the environment). In this way, it avoids buying extra hotels which cost ex-
tra money. Also, the agent can receive optimal utility by not shortening the
stay of its customers. In competitive games, our agent buys ﬂights according to
its assessment of the ﬂight category.7 In these games, the agent may alter its
customers’ travel plans in order to avoid staying in expensive hotels for long
periods. In semicompetitive games, the agent behaves in between these two
strategies; it buys most of the ﬂights earlier and will only change travel plans
if a signiﬁcant improvement can be obtained.
3. EVALUATION
Our evaluation of SouthamptonTAC is composed of two components: (i) the
resultsfromthe2002competitionitselfand(ii)ourpost-hocsystematicanalysis
in a range of controlled environments.
3.1 TAC-02 Results
TAC-02 consisted of a preliminary round (mainly used for practice and ﬁne tun-
ing), a seeding round, the semiﬁnals and the ﬁnal round. The seeding round
determined groupings for the semiﬁnals and involved about 440 games. To this
end, Table VI shows the result of each agent’s relative score to Southampton-
TAC. Note there is less than 2 points difference between ATTac and Southamp-
tonTAC and given the random features of the game their performance should
be considered as broadly similar. The top 16 agents were organized into two
“heats” for the semiﬁnals based on their position in the seeding round and the
ﬁrst four teams in both heats entered into the ﬁnal round. Table VII shows the
scores (again relative to our agent) of all the agents in this ﬁnal round. Again
the difference between SouthamptonTAC and the top agent is small, less than
0:8% than whitebear.
Overall, in the course of the competition some 606 games were played and
SouthamptonTAC had a higher mean score than both ATTac and whitebear.
7The agent continuously monitors the ﬂight price changes and categorises each ﬂight according to
its rate of change. Based on the ﬂight category, it decides when to buy the ﬂights in a ﬂexible way
(e.g., rapidly rising ﬂights are bought quickly, whereas slow rising ones are bought near the end).
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Table VI. Result of Seeding Round (440 Games)
Rank Agent avg(-10 worst) Avg
1 ATTac 3129.5C1.8 3033.5C4.2
2 SouthamptonTAC 3129.5 3033.5
3 UMBCTAC 3129.5¡11.1 3033.5¡16.6
4 livingagents 3129.5¡38.1 3033.5¡24.9
5 cuhk 3129.5¡74 3033.5¡62.1
6 Thalis 3129.5¡129.8 3033.5¡131.9
7 whitebear 3129.5¡163.9 3033.5¡158.2
8 RoxyBot 3129.5¡274.2 3033.5¡300.8
Table VII. Result of Final Round (32 Games)
Rank Agent Avg(-worst) Avg
1 whitebear 3492C64.4 3385.5C27.3
2 SouthamptonTAC 3492 3385.5
3 Thalis 3492¡140.8 3385.5¡139.2
4 UMBCTAC 3492¡171.4 3385.5¡149.9
5 Walverine 3492¡176.4 3385.5¡175.9
6 livingagents 3492¡182.2 3385.5¡204.6
7 kavayaH 3492¡242.2 3385.5¡286.0
8 cuhk 3492¡244.2 3385.5¡316.7
We believe that this large number of games and the very nature of the compe-
tition mean that the difference in the trader’s scores reﬂect true differences in
the performance of the agents’ strategies. Thus, we believe SouthamptonTAC
performs successfully in a wide range of situations.
3.2 Controlled Experiments
To evaluate the performance of our agent in a more systematic fashion than is
possibleinthecompetition,wedecidedtorunaseriesofcontrolledexperiments.
To do this, we devised two competitor agents that adopt strategies consistent
with the broad classes of behavior that were observed in the competition:
—Risk-seekingagent(RS-agent). Thisisbasedonthebehavioroflivingagents,
UMBCTAC,andWalverineagents(seeSection4formoredetails).Thisagent
buys all the ﬂights tickets at the beginning of the game, bids aggressively in
hotel auctions and never changes the plans for its customers.
—Risk-averse agent (RA-agent). This is based on the behavior of Southamp-
tonTAC-01, Retsina, and sics agent (see Section 4 for more details). This
agent buys a small number of ﬂight tickets at the beginning of the game to
leave some ﬂexibility and it will change the customers’ travel plans according
to how the game unfolds.
For both these types of agents, as well as for SouthamptonTAC, a record is
kept of the closing price history and the initial travel plans for the customers
are calculated based on the average price of this history.
The set-up of the experiment is shown in Table VIII where it can be seen that
there are 36 different cases which cover all possible combinations of Southamp-
tonTAC, RA-agents and RS-agents given that there can only be eight agents in
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.228 ² M. He and N. R. Jennings
Table VIII. Experiment Set-Up for Controlled Experiments.
The Light Grey Area Indicates Competitive Environments
and Dark Grey Non-Competitive Ones
Number of RA-agents
01234567
0 87654321
1 7654321
2 654321
3 54321
4 4321 "
5 3 2 1 Number of
6 21 Ã SouthamptonTAC
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
R
S
-
a
g
e
n
t
s
7 1 agents
one game. For example, in the case where the number of RA-agents is 2 and the
number of RS-agents is 1, there will be 5 SouthamptonTAC agents. For each
case, between 50–1008 games were played to test the performance of each kind
ofagent.Inthisway,itispossibletoproduceawiderangeofenvironments,from
competitive to noncompetitive, and to evaluate the corresponding performance
of the different types of agents and the broad behavior trends. The following
Conjectures were used as an approximate guide for designing the experiments.
Conjecture 1: The more RS-agents there are in the game, the more com-
petitive (see Section 2.1) it will be and the more RA-agents there are, the less
competitive it will be (shown by the shading in Table VIII).
Conjecture 2: RS-agents will do well in noncompetitive environments and
RA-agents will do well in competitive ones.
In terms of Conjecture 1, the average hotel clearing price for those environ-
ment marked as competitive (in Table VIII) is 240 and for those environment
marked as noncompetitive it is 67. Thus, Conjecture 1 can be seen to hold.
We now start to analyze the performance in the different environments.
Figure 3 shows the performance surface of SouthamptonTAC in the different
cases. The x-axis and y-axis represent the number of RS-agents (NRS) and RA-
agents(NRA),thus,thenumberofSouthamptonTACis8¡NRS¡NRA.Thez-axis
shows the average score9 of SouthamptonTAC. The higher the score, the better
the agent performs. Figures 4 and 5 show the performance of the RS-agents
and RA-agents on similar graphs.
As shown in Figure 3, SouthamptonTAC does best, obtains the highest score,
in competitive games (i.e., where the number of RS-agents is big). This is due
to the adaptive nature of its strategy. When it ﬁnds the game competitive, it
alters its strategy in the direction of being risk-averse. In noncompetitive envi-
ronments, where there are many RA-agents, SouthamptonTAC also does well
since it adapts its strategy to bid aggressively because it can always obtain the
8This number differs from game to game. The experiment for a single case stops when the relative
scores of the agents become stable.
9Suppose there are m SouthamptonTAC agents, and the average scores of these agents are
s1, s2, :::,s m. Then the average score shown on the z-axis is (
Pm
iD1 si)=m.
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Fig. 3. Performance of SouthamptonTAC in different environments.
Fig. 4. Performance of Risk-seeking agents in different environments.
goods it wants. Both of these observations are consistent with Conjecture 2.
The worst situation for SouthamptonTAC is when all the players are like it-
self. This is because the competitive tendency of the agents causes the hotel
prices to rise to moderate levels and then many of the agents change their cus-
tomers’ travel plans at approximately the same time. This switching behaviour
causes the counterpart hotel prices to rise (because of increased competition)
and the agents to have unused ﬂights or hotel rooms bought on account of
their previous travel plans. For RS-agents, as shown in Figure 4, the results
alsosupportConjecture2.RS-agentsbehaveverywellinnoncompetitivegames
and their performance decreases rapidly as the number of RS-agents increases.
This happens because as more agents bid aggressively, the hotel closing prices
get higher. RA-agents behave best in competitive environments when there are
many RS-agents, perform adequately in noncompetitive games and worst in
semicompetitive games when there are a few RS-agents and SouthamptonTAC
agents(seeFigure5).Inthelattertwocases,RA-agentschangetheircustomers’
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Fig. 5. Performance of Risk-averse agents in different environments.
travel packages reasonably often and this causes them to buy extra hotels and
ﬂights that they cannot subsequently use.
Moreover, from Figures 3 to 5, we ﬁnd that the range of scores for each kind
of agent are different; for SouthamptonTAC it is [1372, 3737], for RS-agents it
is [¡2742, 2374] and for RA-agents it is [1709, 3445]. Thus, the RA-agent has
the narrowest score range and is the most stable agent. The RS-agent has the
widest score range since its performance depends heavily on the environment
it is situated in. SouthamptonTAC is in between, less stable than RA-agents
(but able to obtain higher scores) but with a better worst performance than
RS-agents.
While Figures 3 to 5 show the performance of a single type of agent in various
environments, Figure 6 compares their scores. There are eight subﬁgures and
eachofthemrepresentsseveralcasesoftheaboveexperiments.10 Wefoundthat
when the number of SouthamptonTAC agents is small (less than 4), they can
always outperform both RS-agents and RA-agents (as shown in (e) to (h) and
some cases in (a) to (d)). This is because SouthamptonTAC can successfully
adapt itself in competitive games and become aggressive in noncompetitive
ones. However, as we discussed previously, when the number of Southamp-
tonTAC agents is above 4, the agents exhibit similar behaviour and make the
market less efﬁcient. Generally, from (a) to (h), it can also be seen that prof-
its for all agent types increase as the number of RA-agents increases (because
these agents keep the hotel prices low).
3.3 Predicting Hotel Prices
Most of the agents in TAC engage in some form of hotel price prediction (see
Section 4). Since, generally speaking, the more accurately the agent can pre-
dict these prices the more easily it can identify proﬁtable actions. To this end,
Table IX shows the accuracy of SouthamptonTAC’s predictions on a minute by
10Forexample,inﬁgure(c),therearetwoRS-agents,thusthehorizontalaxisrepresentsthenumber
of RA-agents and the vertical axis is the average score of the different agent types.
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Fig. 6. Relative Performance of the agents in different environments.
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Table IX. Actual vs. Predicted Hotel Prices. Positive Figure
Means Over Prediction and Negative Figure Means Under
Prediction
Hotel 4 5678 9 1 0 1 1
T3 86
T2 40 23
S3 76 ¡62 50
S4 3 9999
S2 83 11 ¡32 ¡53 ¡17
S1 4 59899 9
T1 7 99888 8 8
T4 87 10 10 10 10 10 10 ¡17
Table X. Hotel Closing Price Prediction in Final Round
Closing order Avg difference Max difference Min difference
1 64 174 8
2 30 103 2
3 29 144 8
4 38 149 1
5 32 115 8
6 30 111 3
72 7 8 78
82 0 6 29
minute basis for a single game (randomly chosen) in the ﬁnal. The ﬁgures in
the table are the difference between the predicted price and the actual price.
Thus,apositivenumbermeansoverpredictionandanegativeonemeansunder
prediction. As we can see, the trend is that the further into the game the predic-
tions are made the more accurate they are. This is because at the beginning the
agent can only work based on the price history of previous games. However, as
the game progresses, more information is revealed (such as the closing order of
the hotels, the current hotel prices and the relation between the hotels). This,
in turn, means more accurate predictions can be made. This is important for
our agent since it enables its ﬂexible decision making to be based on more or
less accurate information. In most cases, our agent tends to over predict the
hotel closing prices. If the hotel prices are not very high, the agent will not
suffer since it will not change the plan for its customers; whereas if the prices
are very high, the agents may change the travel plans for its customers and
therefore obtain a lower score (since it may have bought ﬂights or rooms that it
cannot now use). However, when hotel prices rise very quickly, our agent tends
to under predict which can cause it to buy highly priced hotels (so reducing its
proﬁt).
Furthermore, Table X shows the difference between the predicted and actual
hotel closing prices for the order in which they closed in the ﬁnal. For example,
for the hotel that closed ﬁrst (whatever that happened to be in a particular
game), the average difference is 64, the maximum difference is 17411 and the
11This number is large and it occurred at the beginning of the ﬁnal where the price history data
was based upon the seeding round (which had very different outcomes from the ﬁnal round).
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Table XI. Comparison Among Agents (RS Means Risk Seeking, RA Risk Averse
and RN Risk Neutral (Between RS and RA). —Means Information Unavailable)
Agent Price Prediction Allocator Attitude
ATTac machine learning ILP RN
cuhk average prices heuristic search RN
livingagents average prices search RS
PainInNEC — Genetic algorithm RA
Retsina price matrix Markov chain RA
RoxyBot price distribution heuristic search RA
sics price distribution branch-and-bound search RA
SouthamptonTAC Fuzzy reasoning ILP RN
UMBCTAC average price heuristic search RS
Walverine Walrasian ILP RS
competitive
equilibrium
whitebear average price greedy search RN
minimum is 8. These results are consistent with those of Table IX and show
that the later a hotel closes, the more accurate our agent’s prediction is.
3.4 Strategy Adaptation
To test the value of the agent being able to adapt its strategy during the course
of a game, we compare the performance of our agent with a nonadaptive variant
(called na-SouthamptonTAC) that is identical apart from the fact that it can-
not change its strategy once a game has started. In each game, there was one
SouthamptonTAC, one na-SouthamptonTAC and the remaining agents were
drawn randomly from a pool of RS-agents and RA-agents. We ran this conﬁgu-
ration for 164 games and computed the average score of each agent type. Our
results were that the adaptive agent received an average score of 3138, the
nonadaptive one an average of 2937 and the other agents an average of 1657
(RS-agents) and 2649 (RA-agents). This shows that being adaptive does indeed
improve the agents’ performance.
4. RELATED WORK
Related work on bidding in multiple heterogeneous auctions in general is dis-
cussed in the companion paper [Anthony and Jennings 2003]. So here we focus
solely on examining agents developed for the TAC. Specially, we discuss the
most successful agents from both TAC-01 and TAC-02 in Table XI. ATTac uses
machine learning techniques to obtain a model of the price dynamics based on
the past data (e.g., the data in the seeding round) to predict the closing prices
of the hotels in the future. It also uses mixed-integer linear programming (ILP)
to ﬁnd the optimal allocation of the goods [Stone et al. 2001]. cuhk agent is
composed of a cost estimator, an allocation and acquisition solver and bidders.
It uses a greedy, heuristic search to ﬁnd the travel packages for customers.
livingagents [Fritschi and Dorer 2002] bases its decisions on closing price data
for the various hotels in past games and it buys all the ﬂights needed at the
beginning of the game. It also buys/sells entertainment tickets at a ﬁxed price
of 80. It makes bids for the needed hotels only once during the game again at a
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.234 ² M. He and N. R. Jennings
ﬁxed price (of 1001). PainInNEC’s strategy is a combination of heuristics and a
genetic algorithm based optimization method, which outputs the goods to buy
and sell given the predicted auction clearing prices and customers’ preferences.
Retsina uses a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to allocate the goods to its
customers and it uses a matrix learned from past games to predict the hotel’s
future prices. RoxyBot [Greenwald and Boyan 2001] decides the goods to bid
for based on heuristic search techniques and applies a marginal utility calcula-
tor to determine the value of the goods. sics uses pricelines for price prediction
and the optimiser performs branch-and-bound search for the best solutions.
UMBCTAC balances the minimal risk and the maximum return to ﬁnd the
best travel plan for its customers. Walverine predicts the hotel closing prices by
calculating the Walrasian competitive equilibrium of the game. whitebear uses
a randomised greedy algorithm to calculate the price of each commodity bought
or sold and uses Bayesian analysis to compute the minimum and average value
of the ﬂight’s determinant factor.
As can be seen from the above discussion, the TAC agent designs incorpo-
rate a variety of AI techniques including fuzzy reasoning, machine learning,
planning, Markov decision making and heuristic searching. Most agents keep
a record of the hotel closing prices and use a variety of methods to predict sub-
sequent hotel closing prices in order to allocate travel packages to customers.
Moreover, a number of the agents adapt their bidding behavior in response to
environmental changes. Such adaptation includes our agent varying its bid-
ding behaviors (as described in Section 2.5); ATTac, which varies the number
of ﬂights it buys at the beginning of the game; and whitebear, which postpones
some ﬂight ticket purchases until after it learns the hotel prices.
5. CONCLUSIONS
SouthamptonTAC has been shown to be successful across a wide range of TAC
environments.Naturally,thestrategiesthathavebeenemployedaretailoredto
the speciﬁc auction context of the competition (as is any agent strategy for any
otherauctioncontext).Nevertheless,webelievethattheTACdomainexhibitsa
number of characteristics that are common to many real-world, on-line trading
environments. These attributes include a time constrained environment, net-
work latency, unpredictable opponents, multiple heterogeneous auction types
and the need to purchase interrelated goods. Given this, we believe that a num-
ber of insights and technologies from our work are applicable in a broader
agent-mediated e-commerce context and our future work aims to exploit these.
First, the uncertainty that is inherent in such situations means that a bidding
agent needs to be able to adapt its behavior and strategy during the course
of its interactions. While attempting to settle these things in advance and not
responding to the prevailing context may sometimes work (even in repeated en-
counters), it can produce brittle behaviour that is not robust in a wide variety
of circumstances. Nevertheless, some degree of prior analysis is essential to set
the basic parameters to approximately correct values otherwise the agent may
take a long time before it starts to perform effectively. Second, the fuzzy tech-
nologies we developed for making predictions, assessing the prevailing context
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and adapting behaviour were shown to be computationally efﬁcient and able to
operate with relative simple information that is likely to be readily available in
most trading contexts. Third, and most generally, effective and robust behavior
requires a detailed understanding of the space of environmental possibilities
and a careful evaluation of the broad responses that are desirable in such cases.
Having obtained this, the speciﬁc behavior within such a framework can then
be ﬁne-tuned using appropriate analysis and adaptive technologies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
During the project, we received help and support from many people. We would
liketothanktheTACteamattheUniversityofMichigan(TAC-01)andSwedish
Institute of Computer Science (TAC-02), including Michael Wellman, Kevin
O’Malley, William E. Walsh, Daniel Reeves Chris Kiekintveld, Joakim Ericsson
and Niclas Finne for setting up the TAC server and the competition and for
responding so promptly to our questions and requests. We would also like to
express our thanks to a number of people from The University of Southampton:
Mike Luck, who went to the US to present our agent at TAC-01 at very short
notice; Yan Zheng Wei, who helped us with agent connecting problems as well
as monitoring the seeding round games in TAC-02; Alastair J. Riddoch, Jon
Hallett and Tim Chown, who helped us with various network difﬁculties that
we experienced in both competitions; and Xudong Luo for his encouragement
and support during the whole course of the competition.
REFERENCES
ANTHONY,P .AND JENNINGS, N. 2003. Developing a bidding agent for multiple heterogeneous auc-
tions. ACM Trans. Internet Tech. 3, 3 (Aug.), 185–217.
FRITSCHI,C .AND DORER, K. 2002. Agent-oriented software engineering for successful TAC par-
ticipation. In Proceedings 1st Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
(Bologna, Italy). 45–46.
GREENWALD,A .AND BOYAN, J. 2001. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study.
In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 115–124.
HE,M .AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2002. SouthamptonTAC: Designing a successful trading agent. In
Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, F. van Harmelen, Ed. IOS
Press, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 8–12.
HE, M., JENNINGS,N .R . ,AND LEUNG, H. F. 2003. On agent-mediated electronic commerce. IEEE
Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 15, 4 (July/Aug.).
PEDRYCZ, W. 1990. Fuzzy sets in pattern recognition methodology and methods. Patt. Rec. 23,1 ,
121–146.
STONE, P., LITTMAN, M., SINGH,S . ,AND KEARNS, M. 2001. ATTac-2000: An adaptive autonomous
bidding agent. J. Artif. Int. Res. 15, 189–206.
SUGENO, M. 1985. An introductory survey of fuzzy control. Inf. Sci. 36, 59–83.
WELLMAN, M., WURMAN, P., O’MALLEY, K., BANGERA, R., LIN, S., REEVES,D . ,AND WALSH, W. 2001.
Designing the market game for a trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Comput. 5, 2, 43–51.
Received May 2002; revised November 2002 and January 2003; accepted January 2003
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 3, No. 3, August 2003.